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The Senate's Power Grab
By Robert H. Bork; Robert H. Bork is a resident scholar at the American
Enterprise Institute. This is adapted from an article in the July/August issue of
"The American Enterprise."
The New York Times
June 23, 1993
In next month's Supreme Court confirmation
hearings, the Senate Judiciary Committee will
undoubtedly ask Ruth Bader Ginsburg detailed
questions about her legal opinions on many divisive
political issues. This is a relatively new practice for
the committee. For most of U.S. history, the
nominee did not even appear before the committee:
It was considered beneath the dignity of the office of
a Justice. (As the Clarence Thomas hearings showed,
that belief has some merit.)
Even when the practice began in the 1930's, the
questioning was usually perfunctory or nonexistent.
In 1962, Byron R. White was asked only about a
dozen questions. William 0. Douglas waited outside
the hearing room and was finally dismissed without
being asked anything in 1939.
Two factors have changed all that. One is the
presence of television in the hearing room. So long as
the cameras are there, confirmations will be
drawn-out photo opportunities.
The other is the politicization of the process. The
Court is no longer primarily a legal institution but
rather a political and cultural power - in one sense,
the supreme political and cultural power, because its
mandates are difficult to override and will not be
ignored or disobeyed. Perhaps it was inevitable that
an institution with such power would come to be
viewed as a political prize and a political weapon.
What can stem this politicization? Practically
speaking, only the citizens' and the Court's
understanding of the difference between judges and
legislators. But devotion to the morality of process
turns out to be a paper obstacle to those who are very
sure about the morality of results. For example, if, as
the National Abortion Rights Action League and the
American Civil Liberties Union feel, morality
demands the right to abortion, there is simply no
point in demonstrating to them that, the Constitution
being utterly silent on the question, abortion is a
question for debate by the American people and
elected officials, not by the Supreme Court.
The purpose of today's televised inquisitions
concerning every thought a nominee ever had about
the minutiae of constitutional law is the same no
matter which side mounts the inquisition. Either
nominees can be induced to give answers that will be
used against them, or they can be forced into
promises that they are likely to keep once on the
Court lest they embarrass themselves.
There are two disastrous consequences of the
judiciary's meticulous parsing of a nominee's views.
First, the televised hearings have become a
referendum on whether Americans approve of
particular constitutional interpretations. The
prohibitions of the Constitution were put in place
precisely to prevent majority opinion from ruling
certain areas of life. That purpose is defeated if
majorities decide what they want the Constitution to
mean.
An equally anticonstitutional. consequence is the
Senate's crossing of the line that separates its powers
from those of the judiciary and the executive
branches. For example, during the Clarence Thomas
hearings, Democratic Senator Herb Kohl complained
about the executive branch's assistance to Justice
Thomas in preparing for the hearings. Of course,
removing executive branch support for the nominee
would be fatal to any confirmation: the amount of
material that must be located, classified and analyzed
in preparation for the hearings is staggering.
Senator Kohl said he was concerned about the
constitutional principle of the separation of powers.
He hinted that it was improper executive branch
influence for the President's men and women to assist
the nominee to prepare for the confirmation hearings.
It is a wonder the Senator did not object to the
President choosing the nominee in the first place.
Actually, some Senators did just that. Democrats
Joseph Biden and Paul Simon said afterward that
President Bush should have to clear future
nominations with the committee - which effectively
meant with the Democrats -- before advancing a
name. The Constitution states that the President shall
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nominate and, with the advice and consent of the
Senate, appointjudges. These Senators suggested that
they assume both functions. So much for the
separation of powers.
That is not the design of our Government. Federal
judges, alone among public officials, are given life
tenure precisely so that they will not be accountable
to the people. They must consider themselves bound
by law that is independent of their own views of what
is desirable. That is why an exploration of judicial
philosophy, and not of political ends, is important in
the confirmation process.
What kinds of questions might properly be put to
a nominee to reveal their judicial philosophy? It is
possible to explore a nominee's views without
requiring a commitment from the nominee to vote a
particular way in the future. If the past is any guide,
however, the confirmation hearings for Ruth Bader
Ginsburg will run along the lines of: "Are you now,
or have you ever been, critical of the reasoning of
Roe v. Wade?"
It need not be so. The question about Roe v. Wade
could be put this way: "If a claim for a constitutional
right to abortion came before the Court, how would
you reason about it and what materials would you
think relevant?" Or, for other subjects, *What
bearing does the fact that the first Congress - which
proposed the religion clauses of the First Amendment
- provided paid chaplains for the House, the Senate
and the military have on questions of the relation of
religion to government?" Or, "Does the Ninth
Amendment's statement that 'the enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people'
authorize judges to strike down legislation by finding
and enforcing unmentioned rights?"
If questions like these are posed to Judge Ginsburg
and future nominees, the Senators and the public will
learn how the the nominees understand the role of a
Justice, without requiring from them a commitment
to vote any particular way on a specific issue.
If a potential Justice were to answer my question
on abortion by saying he or she would decide
whether the principle of privacy was included in the
Constitution by examining the document and the
debates surrounding its ratification, we would know
the nominee is committed to interpretations of the
original understanding of the Constitution's
principles.
If the nominee added, however, that he or she
would be guided also by principles of morality not to
be found in the Constitution, we would know that the
nominee intended to govern us by his or her
morality.
If a nominee were to say, as many jurists would,
that the Court is entitled to strike down legislation on
the basis of unenumerated rights, we would know that
the potential Justice is not bound by the actual law of
the Constitution and would feel free to override it on
the basis of provisions she wishes the Founders had
had the wisdom to adopt.
In an ideal world, the Senators would find such a
willingness to supply principles not originally
understood to be in the Constitution to be grounds for
disqualifying a nominee. Where the Constitution is
silent, the Justice has no such authority. To act
against legislation without authority is to engage in
civil disobedience from the bench and to perpetrate
limited coups d'etat that overthrow the American
form of government.
That is by no means a majority position in the
Senate, on the Court or among legal academics, and
perhaps it is not a majority view among the American
people. Nevertheless, if Senators ask questions about
judicial philosophy rather than seeking commitments
to particular decisions, it-would make a significant
contribution to the American understanding of the
Supreme Court's legitimate role in governing us.
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TESTING THE PROCESS: INQUIRY IMPROPRIETIES
By Bruce Fein
Copyright 1993 News World Communications, Inc.
The Washington Times
July 20, 1993, Tuesday, Final Edition
Today Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg commences her
Supreme Court confirmation hearings before the
Senate Judiciary Committee. It is expected to
interrogate the nominee intensely on a spectrum of
case precedents or constitutional doctrines of
particular concern to members or their constituents.
That confirmation phenomenon - which blossomed
with Judge Robert H. Bork - is tantamount, as sitting
Justice Antonin Scalia recently lamented, to "having
a plebiscite on the meaning of the Constitution every
time a justice is nominated, and that's crazy."
Judge Ginsburg should resist answers to any
questions seeking to elicit her judicial views toward
particular cases or particular doctrines they establish.
She should echo the words of nominee Felix
Frankfurter, who declined to elaborate on his record
before the Judiciary Committee in 1939. He
explained: "While I believe that a nominee's record
should be thoroughly scrutinized by this committee,
I hope you will not think it presumptuous on my part
to suggest that neither such examination nor the best
interests of the Supreme Court will be helped by the
personal participation of the nominee himself. I
should think it improper for a nominee no less than
for a member of the court to express his personal
views on controversial political issues affecting the
court."
Alexander Hamilton described the Senate
confirmation power as "an excellent check upon the
spirit of favoritism in the president," designed to
deter "the appointment of unfit characters from state
prejudice, from family connection, from personal
attachment, or from a view to popularity." Nowhere
did either he or other constitutional convention
delegates hint that Senate inquiries into court
precedents would be legitimate. Indeed, the opposite
was suggested by the convention's rejection of a
Supreme Court role in a proposed executive council
of revision to examine laws passed by Congress. As
South Carolina delegate John Rutledge remonstrated:
"The judges ought never to give their opinion on a
law until it comes before them."
That remonstrance applies equally to case
precedents that might be considered by a Supreme
Court nominee after confirmation. A nominee like
Judge Ginsburg is intellectually compromised before
the Senate Judiciary Committee. She knows that her
cherished aspiration to a seat on the nation's most
venerated court largely turns on pleasing its 18
members. She will naturally desire to comment on
cases or doctrines that will elicit member approval.
As Shakespeare noted, the wish becomes father to the
thought, and answers are given that might not have
been forthcoming in a politically neutral judicial
cloister. That intellectual corruption result can
obtain, for instance, from an inquiry into the
Supreme Court's controversial 5-4 flag-burning
precedents by a member who has championed
flag-desecration laws. The consequence subverts the
Supreme Court's independence because the
interpretations of a justice have been warped in a
quest for public acclaim during confirmation
hearings.
Concededly, a justice may reverse confirmation
views after accession to the Supreme Court. But
human nature strongly resists such embarassment and
the appearance of perjured testimony. Robert
Jackson, when confronted with an antipodean
contradiction between his interpretation of a law as
attorney general and as a Supreme Court justice,
displayed a rare sheepish humility, confesssing
astonishment in McGrath vs. Kristensen (1950) that
a man of his intelligence could have been guilty of
giving the earlier opinion.
The impropriety of case-specific and
doctrine-specific Senate inquisition of nominees is
substantiated by the unbroken tradition of presidents
to renounce that temptation in selecting them. As
Abraham Lincoln elaborated regarding his selection
of Salmon P. Chase for chief justice: "We cannot
ask a man what he will do, and if we should, and he
should answer us, we should despise him for it."
Neither Presidents Reagan nor Bush nor their Justice
Department agents sought to explore the views of
their Supreme Court nominees regarding particular
precedents. And there is no evidence that President
Clinton departed from that admirable restraint in
selecting Judge Ginsburg.
History militates against an assertive Senate role
in the confirmation process because of its
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characteristic descent into petty and unelevating
partisanship. Professor Henry J. Abraham has
recounted one such fiasco: "President [Grant]
nominated his attorney general, the popular -
although not in the Senate - outspoken and
independent Ebenezer R. Hoar. Hoar was superbly
qualified, but after seven weeks of debate and delay,
the Senate rejected him 24-33 on Feb. 3, 1870. The
majority was furious with Hoar for his refusal to
back their strictly partisan suggestions for lower-court
nominees, his active labors on behalf of a merit civil
service system for the federal government and his
opposition to Andrew Johnson's impeachment."
A Democrat-controlled Senate denied Judge Bork
confirmation in 1987 despite his awesome credentials
and virtual identity of views with a 1986 nominee
who received unanimous Senate approval, Justice
Scalia. Judge Bork's opponents feared the political
ramifications of his eminently defensible
constitutional views.
Post-Bork nominees have lacked the luminescence
of several who graced the Supreme Court some 60
years ago: Oliver Wendell Holmes, Louis Brandeis,
Harlan Fiske Stone, Charles Evans Hughes and
Benjamin Cardozo. That deterioration cannot be
ascribed solely or predominantly to the recent
practice of case-specific and doctrine-specific Senate
interrogations, but it seems to discredit the
proposition that the latter elevates the caliber of
Supreme Court appointments.
Judge Ginsburg is no tabula rasa to the Senate.
She has authored 316 opinions as a federal appeals
judge and numerous articles on the law. That record
is more than sufficient to appraise her intellectual
competence for the Supreme Court.
She should confine her testimony to issues bearing
on judicial temperament, general philosophies of
constitutional or statutory interpretation and any
allegations of corruption in the selection process.
Such a courageous posture and restoration of the
Frankfurter confirmation precedent would be a
priceless contribution to preserving the Supreme
Court's independence from partisan politics.
Bruce Fein is a lawyer and free-lance writer
specializing in legal issues.
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GINSBURG HITS HOME RUN IN GAME SHE ALREADY WON: A MODEL MODERATE
BY EVA M. RODRIGUEZ
Copyright 1993 American Lawyer Newspapers Group Inc.
Legal Times
July 26, 1993
She spouted reams of case law from memory and
effortlessly found the perfect quotes from former
Supreme Court justices to buttress her points. She
was candid when she wanted to be, evasive when she
needed to be. In short, Supreme Court nominee Ruth
Bader Ginsburg turned in a masterful performance
before the Senate Judiciary Committee last week.
But she didn't need to, say a wide range of
observers of and former participants in
judicial-confirmation politics.
In fact, they say, almost any nominee could have
breezed through as easily as Ginsburg did. With the
same party running the White House and the Senate,
and with little opposition from conservative interest
groups, it would have taken a major blunder to
imperil the nomination.
"It's a Democratic nominee in a Democratically
controlled Senate. What else do you need to know?"
says John Bolton, senior fellow at the Manhattan
Institute for Public Policy and a former assistant
attorney general for legislative affairs under President
Ronald Reagan. "It was over by the time the
hearings began."
Mark Tushnet, a professor at Georgetown
University Law Center and a former clerk for the late
Justice Thurgood Marshall, agrees.
"As theater, [a more controversial nominee]
would've been more interesting, because the
Republican senators would do a lot more screaming,"
Tushnet says. "But what could the Republicans do?
They could parade n a lot of people who say they
don't like [the nominee.] But, so what?" Tushnet
adds, pointing out that Ginsburg's opponents simply
haven't got the votes.
Supreme Court confirmation politics have grown
steadily more contentious over the years, as senators
have placed anything about a nominee's professional
philosophy or personal life within their purview.
But the tenor of the confirmation proceedings,
many argue, is more a function of the partisan
currents swirling outside the hearing room than of the
views and character of the nominee being grilled
inside.
Both Robert Bork and Clarence Thomas would
have generated controversy, no matter who had
controlled the government. But the fact that the
White House and the Senate were under split control
gave their opponents the opening that they needed to
make political headway with their complaints.
Ginsburg benefited from more than just the
Democratic reign in both the executive and legislative
branches. She also has had the good fortune to
follow several bruising confirmation fights. Coming
on the heels of the Thomas-Anita Hill affair - as
well as the battle over the failed nomination of Zoe
Baird to be attorney general - the Senate Judiciary
Committee seems all too eager to give Ginsburg a
smooth and courteous ride.
Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Joseph
Biden Jr. (D-Del.) acknowledged as much during last
week's hearings.
"Believe me, you are welcome here this morning,"
Biden said July 20, the opening day of Ginsburg's
confirmation session. The absence of controversy
"was the most wonderful thing that's happened to
me" since he took over as chairman, Biden said.
The hearings concluded last week, and the
committee is scheduled to vote on Ginsburg's
nomination on July 29. A vote by the full Senate
will likely take place before its scheduled recess Aug.
9.
Perfect Fit
Ginsburg's background played perfectly into the
political situation on the committee. A former
activist for women's rights who argued numerous
landmark cases before the high court, she offered an
opportunity for redemption to senators worried that
their aggressive questioning of both Hill and nominee
Baird left them with an image of being insensitive to
women.
And the moderate record she compiled during her
13 years on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
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Circuit obviously aided her cause. The fact that she
has been politically palatable to Republican leaders,
including Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), the ranking
minority member of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
has only helped clear her path to confirmation.
"Most of the people who feared a Laurence Tribe
[the Harvard Law School professor] breathed a sigh
of relief when they got Judge Ginsburg," says
Charles Cooper, a former Justice Department official
who helped shepherd judicial nominees under
President Reagan. "There are a number of other
names that he could've nominated who would have
ignited much more controversy."
Republicans also may have held their fire because
they knew that Ginsburg was a lesser evil than many
other, more liberal, choices that Clinton could have
made.
"She's certainly the best of the Carter appointees,"
says a federal judge who wishes to remain
anonymous. "I think most of [the Republican
senators] know she's the best they can hope for."
That was no accident, according to Elliot
Mincberg, legal director for People for the American
Way, a liberal lobbying group.
"One way or another there was, in effect, more
consideration with Clinton than under Bush or
Reagan," Mincberg says. "They [Republican
presidents] picked someone and in effect said to the
Democrats, 'You don't like it, go after them.'"
Her bipartisan base of support, coupled with her
top-notch rating from the American Bar Association,
make her confirmation all but assured - and make it
pointless for the GOP to try to roil the waters, some
say.
"It's Barney the dinosaur for adults: 'I love you.
You love me,'" says Samuel Gerdano, a former
Judiciary Committee counsel for Sen. Charles
Grassley (R-Iowa).
But according to Mincberg, critics should not chalk
up Ginsburg's success in the hearings only to political
expediency. Ginsburg, he says, has dictated the tone
for the conspicuously genteel, often monotonous
hearings.
"I think it's a disservice to say it's nothing more
than politics," Mincberg says. "Part of the problem
for the Republican senators is that she's an incredibly
smart person, and she's sitting there without notes
and rattling off constitutional doctrine. I'm not
surprised that there hasn't been much opposition."
Ginsburg can't be accused of ducking controversial
topics during the hearing. While she agitated Hatch
by refusing to discuss her views on capital
punishment, she has openly embraced abortion rights
for women, as well as reiterated her support for the
Equal Rights Amendment, even if only for
"symbolic" reasons.
And her view that laws should be expanded to
include those who have been legally ostracized
because of "rank discrimination" could have vast
implications for homosexuals' civil rights.
Ginsburg's statements have incensed conservatives.
"She delivered a ringing statement in favor of
abortion," complained Kay Cole James of the Family
Research Council during her July 23 testimony
against Ginsburg's nomination. "I think it's a
tragedy that we've sunk to the point that this is our
idea of a non-controversial nominee."
Had the Senate she faced been controlled by the
opposing party, Ginsburg would have had to tread
carefully on such politically volatile territory. But
both the nominee and the White House knew that she
would be relatively safe in the bosom of a Senate
controlled by political allies. And that's a luxury
Bork, the brilliant conservative jurist with a lengthy,
nettlesome paper trail, could only dream about.
"Judge Bork was denied his seat on Nov. 4, 1986
- the day the Senate changed," says Gerdano,
recalling that, at the time Bork was nominated in
1987, the Democrats had recently taken over as the
majority party in the Senate. "It was a direct cause
and effect."
If the 60-year-old Ginsburg's performance last
week was a hit on Capitol Hill and with the White
House, it made an even bigger impact on some of her
colleagues back at the D.C. federal courthouse, who
say that she's been so impressive that she may be
purposefully building a rapport with the Judiciary
Committee with an eye toward an even bigger prize.
"She's obviously running for chief judge, should
[current Chief Justice William] Rehnquist step
down," says this jurist, who asked not to be
identified. "The talk around here is that things are
going so well for her, maybe she's running for God."
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JUDGES OVERRIDE LIMITS ON INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES
By RICHARD CARELLI, ASSOCIATED PRESS
Copyright 1992 The Times Mirror Company
Los Angeles Times
May 3, 1992, Sunday, Bulldog Edition
If the Supreme Court were to reverse its own 1973
ruling and say abortion is not a constitutional right,
the sea change in American law would cause barely
a ripple for women in California and Florida.
Legislators in most states would be free to impose
new restrictions or even outlaw abortion. But
like-minded lawmakers in Sacramento and
Tallahassee would be stymied -- by rulings of their
state's highest court.
Today, a growing number of state courts are
mining their home-grown constitutions - interpreting
words most often virtually identical to those in the
federal Constitution - to discover expanded
individual rights.
Such rulings are insulated from any
second-guessing by the U.S. Supreme Court. The
final arbiter of any provision within a state
constitution is that state's highest court.
The California Supreme Court and the Florida
Supreme Court have ruled that the right of privacy
provided by their state's constitution -- independent of
any right gleaned from the federal Constitution -
includes a woman's choice to end her pregnancy.
"Those states are safe states in that sense," said
Marcy Wilder, a lawyer with the National Abortion
Rights Action League. "There would be no
immediate impact."
Similar state constitution decisions have been
issued by state appellate courts in Michigan and New
York, Wilder said, but those states' highest courts
have not yet ruled on the issue.
"These kinds of state court decisions are growing
like dandelions in a spring lawn," said John Hingson
III, an Oregon City, Ore., criminal-defense lawyer
and outspoken champion of what he believes is a
largely untapped wellspring of individual rights.
"There is no obligation for state courts to blindly
follow the decisions of an archconservative U.S.
Supreme Court as it whittles away at the Bill of
Rights," Hingson said. "State constitutions provide a
refuge for the liberties secured 200 years ago on the
federal level."
The trend has its critics.
"I'm not a fan of activist judicial review, whether
by state or federal courts," said Earl Maltz, a law
professor at Rutgers University. "Most of those who
applaud this trend have a not-very-well-disguised
agenda: liberalism. Confronted with dim prospects at
the U.S. Supreme Court, they are saying, 'Let's look
for some other court to do other liberal stuff."'
Other signals from the states:
* After the nation's highest court indicated that
Amish residents of Minnesota could not depend on
the federal Constitution to fend off a law requiring
brightly colored warning symbols on their
horse-drawn buggies, the Minnesota Supreme Court
said its state constitution offered greater protection
for religious views.
The Amish were exempt from the law, the state
court said.
* The U.S. Supreme Court long ago upheld the
constitutionality of government bans on funding for
women on welfare who seek abortions. But state
courts in California, Connecticut and Massachusetts
have ruled that such restrictions in their state
programs providing medical aid to the poor violate
their state constitutions. Women on welfare generally
cannot be denied financial help for abortions in those
states.
* The federal Constitution offers no protection for
"obscene" speech and expression. But in Oregon, due
to a 1987 decision by its Supreme Court, full legal
protection is offered for obscenity.
Retired Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan
was the first champion of this brand of states' rights.
Brennan's 1977 article in the Harvard Law Review
praising the use of state constitutions as a resource
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for individual rights won national attention. But such
use remained rare for the next decade, pioneered by
the highest courts of New Jersey, California and
Oregon.
The highest courts in Hawaii, Alaska, Washington,
South Dakota and Pennsylvania have joined the trend,
albeit in limited fashion.
The federal Constitution sets a minimum standard,
and no state government can offer less protection for
individual rights than what the Supreme Court says
the Constitution requires.
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SEN. METZENBAUM TO PUSH LEGISLATION TO VOID SUPREME COURT'S BIAS DECISION.
Copyright (c) The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 1993
DAILY LABOR REPORT
JULY 8, 1993
1993 DLR 129 d6
Sen. Howard M. Metzenbaum (D-Ohio) has invited
other senators to join him in sponsoring legislation to
overturn a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision that
he said "jeopardizes workers' civil rights
protections."
In a July 1 letter to his colleagues, Metzenbaum
said the court's 5-4 ruling in St. Mary's Honor
Center v. Hicks "may leave discrimination victims
unable to prove their cases absent direct evidence of
bias. . . contrary to 30 years of federal case law. In
short, Hicks turns our federal civil rights law on its
head."
According to Metzenbaum, the majority's reading
of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act "rewards
employers who fabricate nondiscriminatory
explanations for their conduct after the fact, at the
expense of workers who suffer illegal harassment and
other intentional discrimination on the job."
Metzenbaum said he plans to introduce the
legislation when the Senate returns from its July 5-9
recess.
Arguing in defense of nearly 20 years of case law,
the Justice Department last April urged the court to
affirm the decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit that an employee who brings a job
bias claim is entitled to judgment as a matter of law
once he establishes a prima facie case and proves that
all the non-discriminatory grounds advanced by the
employer are a pretext for discrimination (75 DLR
AA-3, 4/21/93).
In an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia, however,
the Supreme Court abandoned the 20-year-old legal
framework for resolving claims of intentional
employment discrimination established in the court's
1973 holding in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
(5 FEP Cases 965). It held that the plaintiff was not
entitled to a judgment even though he had established
a prima facie case of discrimination and disproved the
employer's only proffered reason for its conduct.
Instead, the court held that plaintiffs may be required
to also "disprove all other reasons suggested, no
matter how vaguely, in the record" (122 DLR AA-1,
D-1, 6/28/93).
Ruling Discourages Claims, Dissent Warned
In a dissent joined by Justices Harry Blackman,
Byron White, and John Paul Stevens, Justice David
Souter charged that the majority's decision stemmed
from "a flat misreading' of the court's prior
opinions. "The Court is throwing out the [existing]
rule for the benefit of employers who have been
found to have given false evidence in a court of law,"
the dissenters claimed.
The new burden of proof, they said, "promises to
be unfair and unworkable."
Souter predicted that the decision will make
intentional discrimination substantially more difficult
to prove and discourage discrimination victims from
suing to enforce their rights. The need to allow
plaintiffs to prove their cases based on circumstantial
evidence, Souter said, is "crucial to the success of
most Title VII claims, for the simple reason that
employers who discriminate are not likely to
announce their discriminatory motive."
But Scalia said the court has "no authority to
impose liability upon an employer for alleged
discriminatory employment practices unless an
appropriate factfinder determines, according to proper
procedures, that the employer has unlawfully
discriminated."
Scalia wrote that "nothing in law would permit us
to substitute for the required finding that the
employer's action was the product of unlawful
discrimination, the much different (and much lesser)
finding that the employer's explanation of its actions
was not believable."
The case involves the firing of Melvin Hicks, a
black shift commander at St. Mary's Honor Center,
a minimum security halfway house in Missouri. In
March 1984, Hicks was suspended for five days by
his white supervisor when several guards under his
supervision were away from their posts. Shortly
after, Hicks was cited for another infraction
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involving the use of a vehicle. The same supervisor
recommended Hicks' termination, but a review
board voted to demote him. Hicks subsequently
threatened the supervisor and was terminated.
A federal district court found that Hicks showed
that the reasons given for the demotion and
termination were pretextual. It also held that the final
confrontation resulting in a threat was manufactured
as a ruse to terminate him. However, the lower court
concluded that Hicks had failed to show that the
actions taken against him were "racially rather than
personally motivated."
BELL TO REVERSE HICKS
INTRODUCED IN HOUSE
Copyright (c) The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.,
1993
DAILY LABOR REPORT
JULY 30, 1993
1993 DLR 145 d21
Rep. David Mann (D-Ohio) has introduced
legislation (HR 2787) to reverse a recent U.S.
Supreme Court ruling that made it more difficult for
plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases to
prove intentional discrimination.
Under Mann's bill, a Title VII plaintiff
complaining of disparate treatment would prevail if
he or she establishes a prima facie case of an
unlawful employment practice, and the defendant
either fails to rebut that evidence or the plaintiff is
able to show that each of the purported
non-discriminatory reasons for the employment
decision is not true.
A spokeswoman for Mann explained that the bill is
intended to reverse the Supreme Court's 5-4 ruling in
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, in which the
court held that the burden of persuasion remains on
a Title VII plaintiff throughout the litigation, and that
a plaintiff does not prove intentional discrimination
merely by showing that an employer's purported
non-discriminatory reasons for an employment
decision are not credible (122 DLR AA-1, D-1). The
Mann bill is intended to restore the pre- Hicks
understanding of Title VII, the spokeswoman for
Mann said.
Mann's bill was introduced on July 28 and referred
to the House Education and Labor Committee.
Earlier this month, Sen. Howard Metzenbaum
(D-Ohio) sent a'letter to Senate colleagues asking
them to join him in sponsoring legislation to overturn
Hicks (129 DLR A-2, 7/8/93). No bill has been
introduced yet in the Senate.
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HEARING OF THE SENATE LABOR COMMITTEE
ABORTION CLINIC ACCESS CHAIRED BY: SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY (D-MA) WITNESS:
ATTORNEY GENERAL JANET RENO
Copyright 1993 Federal Information Systems Corporation Federal News Service
MAY 12, 1993, WEDNESDAY
ATT. GEN. RENO:
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I
greatly appreciate the opportunity to be here with you
today to support Senate bill 636, the Freedom of
Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1993. Enactment
of this bill is crucial to ensuring that women have an
unobstructed opportunity to choose whether or not to
have an abortion. In addition to this oral statement,
I have submitted a written statement for the record.
This subject has been of special importance to me.
At the time of my confirmation, Dr. David Gunn had
just been killed for his work in providing abortion
services in Florida. I promised the members of that
committee that if I were confirmed as Attorney
General I would undertake a review of federal law to
determine what could be done in this area.
Immediately upon assuming office, I directed
attorneys in the Civil Rights Division and in the
Criminal Division of the Department of Justice to
examine existing law and report back to me. They
did so, and their unanimous judgment was that
existing federal laws while perhaps applicable in
some instances were inadequate. I thereupon
instructed them to cooperate closely with members of
Congress to assist in crafting the best possible
legislation to remedy this deficiency. I emphasized
that the legislation must secure the rights of women
seeking reproductive health services and the
individuals who provide those services while
respecting the First Amendment rights of those who
opposed abortion to express that opposition in
meaningful ways. I also stated that passage of this
legislation would be one of the department's top
priorities. I remain firm in that commitment.
I am very pleased today to report my strong
endorsement of Senate bill 636, which achieves the
goals I set for abortion clinics legislation. The
Department of Justice is convinced that Senate bill
636 is constitutional and, with minor changes, will
effectively ensure women access to abortion without
suppressing the legitimate activities of those who
oppose abortion.
Some have asked whether there is a need for federal
legislation. My unequivocal answer is "Yes." A
woman's right to choose whether to terminate a
pregnancy is fundamental. While a substantial
majority of Americans support that right, a deeply
sincere minority opposes abortion. The right of
individuals in that minority to express their views
must be respected. In recent years, however, some
anti- abortion activists have increased the intensity of
their activities from picketing to physical blockades,
sabotage of facilities, stalking and harassing abortion
providers, arson, bombings, and finally, culminating
in the murder of Dr. Gunn.
In the process, they have succeeded in shutting
down abortion clinics, delaying access to
time-sensitive health care, and otherwise making it
impossible for women to choose to exercise their
right to choose.
This is a problem that is national in scope. It is
occurring throughout the country: on the doorstep of
the nation's capital, in Alexandria and Falls Church
in northern Virginia, in Pensacola and Melbourne in
Florida, in West Hartford, Connecticut, in Wichita,
Kansas, in Fargo, North Dakota, and in Dallas,
Texas, just to name a few of the more visible
incidents. Moreover, much of the activity has been
orchestrated by groups functioning on a nationwide
scale. Because of this nationwide scope, the problem
transcends the ability of any single local jurisdiction
to address it.
The problem also exceeds the capabilities of local
law enforcement on occasions in other ways. Groups
such as Operation Rescue have been able to marshal
sufficient participants trained in tactics designed to
obstruct law enforcement that they have overwhelmed
the resources of local law enforcement. A prime
example is the assault on two clinics in Wichita,
Kansas in the summer of 1991 by Operation Rescue.
Large numbers of activists converged on Wichita and
physically blockaded the clinics. When police moved
in to arrest them, they moved in baby steps, and
when arrested frequently refused to identify
themselves to local law enforcement officials. The
clinics were closed for a week and were reopened
only as a result of an injunction entered by the
federal district court, which enabled federal marshals
to move in. The district court found that Operation
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Rescue has purposefully overwhelmed the resources
of the city's relatively small police forces to respond
effectively. This situation has been repeated in other
jurisdictions.
Frustrated by the inability of local law enforcement
to protect their rights, abortion providers and
patients have turned to federal law for assistance.
Numerous cases have been reported in federal district
courts filed by abortion providers seeking to enjoin
interference with their activities pursuant to
42USC1985(3) (?). Many of these cases also alleged
violations of state law, but the focus has been on
Section 1985(3), a reconstruction era civil rights law..
In Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Center -
Health Clinic, 113 Supreme Court 753 (?) in 1993,
the Supreme Court addressed the relevance of this
statute to blockades of abortion clinics and severely
restricted it applicability. The Court concluded that
Operation Rescue activities in that case had not
disfavored women by reason of their sex as required
by 1983(3) - 85(3), but had been motivated by a
desire to prevent abortions. The Court refused to
equate hostility to abortion with hostility to women.
The Court also held that the right to abortion,
which falls under the 14th Amendment, is protected
by the Constitution - (audio break) - and not private
infringement. The only right protected by the
Constitution against private infringement that was
alleged in the case was the right to travel interstate.
The Court held that the Operation Rescue had not
acted with the conscious aim of interfering with that
right. Bray severely curtailed the effectiveness of
Section 1985(3) as a remedy for abortion clinic
blockades, and the restrictions placed by the Court
on that statute warrant a congressional response.
I hasten to add, however, that the department does
not view Bray as having eliminated Section 1985(3)
as a tool for addressing the activities of anti- abortion
activists. We recently filed a brief as amicus curiae
in the Tenth Circuit in the Wichita clinic case
opposing Operation Rescue's request that the Court
summarily vacate the preliminary injunction and
order the case dismissed in the light of Bray. Our
brief argues that factual differences between this case
and Bray are sufficient to preclude summary
dismissal, and that the meaning of the hindrance
clause of Section 1985(3), which is the supreme -
which the Supreme Court declined to consider in
Bray, remains unsettled and should be addressed.
Therefore, while we do not view Section 1985(3) as
irrelevant to protection against interference with
abortion rights, it is not an adequate solution. Nor
have we been able to identify any other federal law
that would be generally applicable to private
interference with a women's right to choose. We
therefore have concluded that existing federal law is
inadequate and new federal authority - (audio break)
- falls easily within the commerce power, just as
Congress had authority in the Civil Rights Act of
1964 to prohibit racial discrimination in public
accommodations because it artificially restricted
economic activity, and on the same basis, to make
criminal racially motivated assaults that interfere with
federally protected rights in the Civil Rights Act of
1968. It has authority to prohibit interference with
individuals seeking to obtain or provide abortion
services.
The provision of abortion services undoubtedly
affects commerce. The entities that provide these
services, including clinics, physicians' offices, and
hospitals, purchase or lease facilities, purchase and
sell equipment, goods, and services, employ people,
and generate income. Moreover, it is well established
that many serve significant numbers of patients from
other states. In Wichita, for example, 44 percent of
.the patients at one clinic came from out of state. Thus
there can be little doubt that abortion providers are
engaged in interstate commerce, and Congress should
not have difficulty developing a legislative record that
supports such a finding.
In addition, it is equally clear that the types of
activities that would be prohibited by Senate Bill 636
have a negative impact on interstate commerce. As
the committee will hear, clinics have been closed
because of blockades and sabotage, and have been
unable to provide services. Abortion providers
have been harassed and frightened into ceasing to
perform abortions. Congress therefore should have
no difficulty in supporting a conclusion that the
conduct, prohibited by Senate Bill 636, results in the
provision of fewer abortions, and unnecessarily
constricts the interstate movement of people and
goods.
Our review of Senate Bill 636 convinces us that it
does not suppress expression in violation of the First
Amendment. Rather, the bill is a facially valid
prohibition of harmful conduct. The bill proscribes
four specific types of conduct: one, the use of force;
two, threats of force; three, physical obstruction to
injure, intimidate, or interfere with an individual
seeking access to abortion services; and four,
destruction of the property of medical facilities.
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The purpose of the legislation is to protect the right
of access to abortion services, and to ensure that
interstate commerce is not impeded. The bill plainly
is not intended to suppress a particular message, and
indeed allows ample room for expression of opinion
through regular, peaceful means. Of course, conduct
can express a message, and is frequently entitled to
First Amendment protection.
But the Supreme Court has stated that government
generally has more latitude in restricting expressive
conduct than it has in restricting speech. Therefore,
the Court has concluded that a sufficiently important
governmental interest in regulating conduct can
justify incidental limitations on First Amendment
freedoms. Indeed, this reasoning is compelled by the
fact that it is possible to find some element of
expression in nearly any conduct, regardless of how
harmful the conduct may be to individuals or society.
That possibility does not mean that government may
not act. Rather, it means that government must have
a sufficiently important reason for doing so, and it
must not target conduct on the basis of its expressive
content.
The government interest in suppression of the use
of force, threats of force, physical obstruction and
destruction of property supply a sufficient
government interest, particularly when coupled with
the need to do so to preserve the right of a woman to
choose to have an abortion. And like other civil
rights laws that prohibit conduct taken because of the
race of the victim, conduct that often expresses a
message, Senate Bill 636 regulates conduct not
because of the message it conveys, but because of the
harm it inflicts on victims by depriving them of
fundamental rights. Senate Bill 636 is narrowly
tailored to accomplish its legitimate goal. Through
the limitations imposed by the intent requirement and
the specifically described conduct that is prohibited,
Senate Bill 636 avoids unnecessary restriction of
expressive conduct.
Nor is it vague; men and women of common
intelligence will have little difficulty discerning what
conduct it prohibits. Certainly, proscriptions on the
use of force, threats of force, physical obstruction,
and destruction of property are sufficiently clear and
well-known in the law that they will not cause
confusion.
Finally, I want to highlight a few of the features of
Senate Bill 636 that I find particularly important.
First, the definition of prohibited activities with a
minor change that I have suggested in my written
statement does a very good job of addressing the
problem without unnecessarily restricting anti-
abortion activities. The inclusion of both civil and
criminal penalties is very important. The civil
remedies of injunctions and damages are appropriate
as a means of addressing massive blockades. Courts
can fashion injunctive relief that will keep clinics
operating, yet allow room for the legitimate
expression of opinion by demonstrators. Damages
are important to compensate those individuals who,
seeking to exercise their rights, suffer real harm,
whether physical or psychological. And the
authorization of statutory damages is appropriate to
encourage victims to pursue violations, and as a
deterrent to violators.
I also think it is very important that the attorney
general have authority to file a civil action. This
approach follows the model of other statutes
protecting individual rights, notably the Fair Housing
Act, by shifting the burden of civil enforcement from
private victims to the government, which is often
better able to pursue such cases and vindicate the
enormous interest that our society has in protecting
individual rights.
The authorization of criminal penalties is essential.
Some opponents of the right to choose have escalated
the level of their opposition in recent years to violent
interference. They have demonstrated a willingness
to break the law and to defy court injunctions.
Unfortunately, criminal sanctions, including
imprisonment, appear necessary to deter and punish
unlawful conduct, as well as simply to incapacitate
some of the more willful and persistent violators. In
this regard, I think the elevated terms of punishment
for repeat offenders and those who cause bodily
injury and death are justified and necessary.
In conclusion, I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
producing such an important and thoughtful bill. I
urge this committee to consider the few changes that
I've suggested in my written statement and then to
move expeditiously towards enactment of this
essential piece of legislation. I'd be pleased to answer
your questions, Mr. Chairman.
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CLOSED-DOOR POLICY FOR REFUGEES
BY HAROLD HONGJU KOH
Copyright 1993 American Lawyer Newspapers Group Inc.
Legal Times
July 26, 1993
Looking back, no one should have been surprised
that the Supreme Court upheld the Bush-Clinton
policy of forcibly returning fleeting Haitian refugees
to their persecutors. The handwriting has been on the
wall at least since January 1992, when the Court, by
an identical 8-1 vote, denied certiorari to an earlier
challenge to the previous Bush policy on Haitian
refugees. In the past two years, the Supreme Court
had intervened three times to stay lower court rulings
favoring the Haitians. Last August, when the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit struck down the
Bush policy of summary return, it took only three
days before the Supreme Court entered a 7-2 order
staying that ruling, thereby ensuring that the policy
would continue for at least 11 months before final
Supreme Court judgment. Having made itself by
these acts a de facto party to the forced-return policy,
how could the Court now turn around and declare it
illegal?
Nevertheless, the Court's 8-1 decision in Sale v.
Haitian Centers Council, 61 U.S.L.W. 4684 (1993),
was a disappointment. The Court placed its
imprimatur on an unprecedented, brutal, and
unnecessary violation of human rights that candidate
Bill Clinton had himself repeatedly assailed as illegal.
During his campaign, Clinton had praised the 2nd
Circuit for making the "right decision in overturning
the Bush administration's cruel policy of returning
Haitian refugees to a brutal dictatorship without an
asylum hearing." Yet in one of his first acts as
president. Clinton out of his way to reverse that
"right decision," never explaining how this flatly
unlawful policy had suddenly become lawful. The
Clinton administration's recent extension of that
executive policy to hapless Chinese refugees on the
high seas shows the grotesque lengths to which the
policy may soon lead.
Blind Deference
Moreover, Justice John Paul Stevens' strangely
apologetic and unconvincing majority opinion
continues the Rehnquist Court's patterns of reflexive
deference to presidential power in foreign affairs and
disturbing hostility toward immigrants, international
law, and international human rights.
The president has not lost a major foreign-affairs
case before the Supreme Court since Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
This past term, -the Court upheld the Immigration and
Naturalization Service policy of arresting and
detaining unaccompanied minors in Reno v. Flores,
113 S. Ct. 1439 (1993), and vacated lower court
orders directing the INS to accept legalization
application beyond the statutory deadline in Reno v.
Catholic Social Services, 61 U.S.L.W. 4652 (1993).
In Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. 1471 (1993),
the Court immunized a foreign sovereign for using
police to commit torture within an employment
relationship.
Recently, this Court has also refused to applying
U.S. law extraterritorially to protect alleged victims
of employment discrimination (Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission v. Arabian American Oil
Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991)), of environmental harm
(Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130
(1992)), and of federal torts (Sandra Jean Smith v.
United States, 113 S. Ct. 1178 (1993)).
Moreover, in the past (few years, the Court has
sanctioned emasculation of a range of international
treaties governing international service of process
(volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486
U.S. 694 (1988)), taking of evidence (Societe
Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. District
Court, 482 U.S. 522 (1987)), and bilateral extradition
(United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188
(1992)) - a pattern continued by its misreading of the
refugee treaty in the Haitian case.
Rights-Free Refugees
Haitian Center Council is part of a much larger
saga that began in the fall of 1991, when a military
coup toppled Haiti's first democratically elected
government. The Bush administration curiously
chose to treat the boatloads of fleeing Haitians as the
problem, not the symptom. Initially, the government
stopped and interviewed all refugees, bringing to the
United States all "screened-in" Haitians who could
demonstrate a "credible fear" of political persecution.
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As more boats came, however, the government
began taking all screened-inn Haitians to the U.S.
Naval Base in Guantanamo, Cuba. There the
government sought to establish a "rights-free' zone,
where de facto political refugees were detained in
military camps behind barbed wire without
due-process rights of any kind.
After the government repelled a legal challenge
brought through the 11th Circuit, Haitian service
organizations brought a second class action in the
Eastern District of New York on behalf of all
screened-in Haitians at Guantanamo. The suit was
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), redux:
Lawyers and clients simply claimed constitutional
rights to speak to one another before the refugees
were returned to possible death or persecution in
Haiti. In response, the government sought Rule 11
sanctions against the plaintiffs and their counsel for
filing a "frivolous" lawsuit and requested a $ 10
million bond, the largest ever requested in the New
York federal courts.
Despite the government's efforts, the plaintiffs won
a preliminary injunction requiring that th Haitians be
afforded counsel before repatriation, and the 2nd
Circuit upheld their "frivolous" claim on appeal.
Order From Kennebunkport
On Memorial Day 1992, then President George
Bush changed course and issued an order from his
Kennebunkport, Maine, vacation home that
authorized the U.S. Coast Guard to return all fleeing
Haitians, forcibly and summarily, to Haiti without
any process whatsoever. The Kennebunkport Order
effectively erected a floating Berlin Wall around
Haiti, preventing Haitians from fleeing not just to the
United States, but to any of the scores of islands
between the United States and Haiti. More troubling,
the order rendered the U.S. Coast Guard agents of
the brutal Haitian dictatorship, for it ensured that
U.S. ships would directly return fleeing refugees into
the hands of their persecutors. The order evoked the
infamous voyage of the St. Louis in 1939, when the
United States rebuffed Jewish refugees arriving in
New York and Miami harbors, forcing many back to
die in Nazi gas chambers.
Last July, the plaintiffs won a 2nd Circuit ruling
declaring the policy illegal. The court found that the
Bush policy violated the plain language of $ 243(h)(1)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which directs
that "the Attorney General shall not deport or return
any alien . . . to a country if the Attorney General
determines that such alien's life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his. .. political opinion."
(Emphasis added.)
Trying Internment
Meanwhile, the government continued to hold
about 310 Haitian men, women, and children with
credible claims of political persecution in the
Guantanamo internment camp, solely because most
had tested HIV-positive. When the Guantanamo
phase of the case returned to the trial court for
consideration of permanent relief, the plaintiffs
challenged the legality of their nearly two-year
confinement in this country's first HIV concentration
camp. Thus, in the space of a year, the same lawsuit
evolved from grim replays of Gideon to the St. Louis
to Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)
(World War II internment camps for Japanese-
American citizens), as our government worked a
succession of human-rights abuses upon poor, black,
sick Haitians - by anyone's definition, a discrete and
insular minority.
During his campaign, Bill Clinton repeatedly had
vowed to free the Guantanamo Haitians and to end
the cruel policy of forced return. Yet just before
taking office, he reneged on both promises and
defended both Bush policies in court. In both cases
the government offered the same shocking defense:
that the Haitians had no legal rights outside the
United States, even though the U.S. government had
seized them, taken them into custody, and (in thee
case of the Guantanamo Haitians) held them behind
barbed wire for more than a year.
June 21 ended the saga with a split decisions:
victory for the Guantanamo Haitians and defeat for
the Haitians coming from Haiti. On June 8, U.S.
District Judge Sterling Johnson Jr. of the Eastern
District of New York ordered the Guantanamo
Haitians immediately released. "If the Due Process
Clause does not apply to the detainees at
Guantanamo," he noted, the government "would have
discretion deliberately to starve or beat them, to
deprive them of medical attention, to return them
without process to their persecutors, or to
discriminate among them based on the color of their
skin."
The Clinton administration chose not to seek a stay
of that order, and on June 21, released the last of the
Guantanamo Haitians into the United States.
Bizarre Interpretation
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On that same day, however, the Supreme Court
sustained the legality of the forced-return policy,
accepting the government's position that neither @
243(h) nor the plain language of Article 33 of the
United Nations Refugee Convention applies to
Haitians apprehended on the high seas. As Justice
Harry Blackmun's dissent pointed out, Justice
Stevens' opinion rested on the implausible assertions
that "the word 'return' does not mean return. . . .
[that] the opposite of 'within the United States' is not
outside the United States, and [that] the official
charged with controlling immigration has no role in
enforcing an order to control immigration."
Justice Stevens first engaged in a long exegesis of
the French and English meanings of the word return
in the statute and the treaty, concluding that the legal
prohibition on returning aliens somehow does not
apply to this kind of return. What his opinion
ignored is that the Kennebunkport Order itself
authorized the Coast Guard "[to] return" Haitian
vessels and their passengers to Haiti. Thus, whatever
return may mean, it is precisely the act that
Presidents Bush and Clinton authorized, but that the
law forbade thein to order.
Second, Justice Stevens argued that Congress'
decision in 1980 to extend then statute's protection
from "any alien within the United States" to "any
alien" was meant only to embrace aliens physically,
but not legally, present within the United States. Yet
where Congress elsewhere in the statute sought to
regulate aliens "physically present in the United
States," it used just that phrase. When, as here, it
meant to address all aliens, wherever located, it
spoke simply of "any alien."
Third, the Court concluded that the statute's
directive to the "Attorney General" was not intended
to limit the president and the Coast Guard. The
argument is reminiscent of that made by the Reagan
administration in the Iran-Contra affair: that the
Boland Amendment's restriction upon U.S. agencies
"involved in intelligence activities" somehow did ot
bind the National Security Council, which did not
ordinarily conduct such activities.
Here Congress had carefully exercised its plenary
power over immigration and directed that "the
Attorney General . . . shall have the power and duty
to control and guard the boundaries and borders of
the United States against the illegal entry of aliens."
By mandating in 1980 that the attorney general "shall
not . . . return any alien" to condition of persecution,
Congress had carefully removed the discretion of the
attorney general and her agents - including the Coast
Guard - to deal with perceived crises through
summary return.
Fourth, Justice Stevens applied the so-called
presumption against extraterritoriality to argue against
applying @ 243(h) to the high seas. But as Justice
Blackmun pointed out, that presumption was designed
primarily to avoid judicial interpretations of a statute
that infringe upon the rights of another sovereign.
The presumption should have had no relevance here,
where the immigration law in question expressly
barred the return of "any alien," covered distinctively
international subject matter, enforced an international
human-rights obligation, and governed U.S. conduct
on the high seas,. where there was no possibility for
conflicts with other jurisdictions.
Equally bizarre, the Court chose to invoke the
presumption in a case where the executive branch had
itself cited the statute as the basis for its own
extraterritorial authority to act. If, as the Court
concluded, the presumption operated to deny the
Haitians extraterritorial statutory protection, a fortiori
it should also have operated to deny the president
extraterritorial authority to stop the Haitians in the
first place.'
Repeating History
Fifth and most troubling, the Court recognized that
the drafters of the U.N. Refugee Convention "may
not have contemplated that any nation would gather
fleeing refugees and return them to the one country
they had desperately sought to escape; such actions
may even violate the spirit of Article 33." Yet instead
of construing the statute's words consistently with
that spirit, Justice Stevens construed them deliberately
to offend the spirit of the treaty that the statute was
meant to execute.
The irony, of course, is that last term in
Alvarez-Machain Justice Stevens vigorously dissented
from a construction of an extradition treaty that
permitted governmental kidnapping of criminal
suspects, reasoning that kidnapping was what that
treaty was drafted to forbid. Here, as only Justice
Blackmun recalled, the refugee treaty was similarly
drafted to prevent a replay of the forced return of
Jewish refugees to Europe - but Justice Stevens
construed the treaty in a manner that would have
permitted that result.
In the end, Haitian Centers Council will be
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remembered as a narrow opinion that validated a
uniquely discriminatory interdiction program. The
Haitian interdiction is conducted pursuant to an
executive agreement with the Haitian government that
we have yet to extract from any other nation
(including China, although our Coast Guard now
stops their refugees in the Gulf of Mexico). The four
swing justices - Stevens, Anthony Kennedy, David
Souter, and Sandra Day O'Connor - probably
concluded that if Bill Clinton could live with forced
return, so could they.
Nevertheless, the decision is an embarrassing one
for a nation of immigrants. Nowhere in the Court's
account of the president's struggle to deal with the
modest Haitian outflow is there any mention of the
human plight of the refugees themselves. As Justice
Blackmun observed, the refugees claimed neither a
right of entry nor even a right not to be intercepted;
"[they] demand only that the United States, land of
refugees and guardian of freedom, cease forcibly
driving them back to detention, abuse and death."
How soon will we regret the decision, as our nation
and others invoke the Court's rationale as reason to
repel fleeing Bosnians, Vietnamese, Chinese?
More fundamentally, the decision's curiously
inward focus and dismissive attitude toward
international law raises legitimate questions about
whether our current Court is equipped to deal with
the post-Cold War world. We are far from the days
when our justices, like John Marshall and John Jay,
were diplomats and statesmen sensitive to the law of
nations. At a time when the world looks out, toward
greater reliance on international law to facilitate
commerce, migration, and democratization, our
Supreme Court insists on looking inward, myopically
fixated on short-term national interest.
If the United States is to continue as the world's
only superpower, how long can its highest court
persist in deciding international cases indifferent to
the principles of comity, sanctity of treaty, and
respect for human rights that must form thee bedrock
of any new world order? GRAPHIC: Illustration, no
caption
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